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Naval War College: Winter 2021 Full Issue

SOME LESSONS ON SPACEPOWER FROM COLIN GRAY 科林·格雷关于太空力量的一些教训

John J. Klein

约翰·J·克莱恩

Where is the theory of space power? Where is the Mahan for the final frontier?

——COLIN S. GRAY

太空权理论在哪里，马汉的最远边界又在哪里？

——科林·格雷

约翰·克莱恩(John J. Klein)是猎鹰研究公司(Falcon Research Inc.)的高级研究员和策略师，也是乔治·华盛顿大学(George Washington University)空间政策研究所(Space Policy Institute)的兼职教授。他拥有英国雷丁大学的博士学位。他是《理解空间战略:空间战争的艺术》(2019年)和《空间战争:战略、原则和政策》(2006年)的作者。

Colin Gray passed away in February 2020. He was a prolific author, and many within academia and at the service war colleges appreciated him as a great strategic theorist. Yet what is lesser known is the profound impact he made on the development of spacepower strategic thought[1]. Absent robust historical experience of conflict in space on which to draw, Gray’s writings led to a better understanding of space strategy. Crucially, Gray explained how spacepower theory should fit within the context of the enduring nature of war, the better to inform the future development of space-warfare strategy.

科林·格雷于2020年2月去世，他是一位高产的作家，学术界和院校的许多人都将他视为一位伟大的战略理论家。但鲜为人知的是，他对发展太空力量战略思想产生了深远的影响[1]。由于缺乏可以借鉴的太空冲突历史战例，格雷的著作使人们对太空战略有了更好的理解。至关重要的是，格雷解释了空间力量理论应该如何适应自古以来的战争原则，以便更好地为空间战争战略的未来发展提供信息。

Gray published over thirty books on military history and strategic studies, along with innumerable articles and monographs. His ideas and concepts are lasting in their ability to illuminate the intricacies of politics, war, and strategy. While Gray provided an abundance of strategic thought on which national security and military practitioners could draw when considering the application of spacepower, this essay will discuss three key subjects: Gray’s development of spacepower theory, his influence as a teacher and mentor, and insights for today’s space professionals and members of the new U.S. Space Force that can be drawn from Gray’s writings.

格雷出版了三十多本关于军事历史和战略研究的书籍，以及无数的文章和专著。他的思想和概念因其揭示政治、战争和战略的复杂性而经久不衰。虽然格雷提供了丰富的战略思想以供国家安全和军事从业人员在考虑应用太空力量时借鉴，但本文将讨论他著作的三个关键主题:格雷对太空力量理论的发展，他作为教师和导师的影响，以及他对当今太空专业人员和新美国太空部队成员的深刻见解。

SPACEPOWER THEORY 太空权理论

Early in his career, Gray showed an interest in space and its relation to the theory of war. In 1982, when he was beginning a stint supporting the Reagan administration’s General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament, he published American Military Space Policy: Information Systems, Weapon Systems and Arms Control. It is noteworthy that the following year the Reagan administration would consider the potential deployment of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), also known as “Star Wars.” For Gray, the publication was intended “to encourage informed debate of U.S. space policy, particularly military space policy.”In this relatively short study, he detailed many of his earliest ideas on spacepower and the character of space warfare, and he addressed U.S. and Soviet technical space capabilities, offensive and defensive actions in space, and the policy implications of the stationing of weapons in orbit. Gray would continue to develop further space-strategy concepts and encourage the development of spacepower theory through his numerous works. Alongside land, sea, air, and cyber power, Gray ensured that the strategic implications of spacepower were considered.

在他职业生涯的早期，格雷表现出对太空及其与战争理论的关系的兴趣。1982年，当他开始支持里根政府的军备控制与裁军总咨询委员会时，他出版了《美国军事空间政策:信息系统、武器系统与军备控制》。值得注意的是，第二年里根总统考虑部署战略防御计划(SDI)，即“星球大战”。在格雷看来，这份出版物的目的是“鼓励对美国太空政策，特别是军事太空政策进行有见地的辩论”。在这个相对较短的研究中，他详细阐述了他关于太空力量和太空战争特征的许多早期想法，他谈到了美国和苏联的太空技术能力、太空的进攻和防御行动，以及在轨道上部署武器的政策含义。格雷将继续进一步发展空间战略概念，并通过他的大量作品鼓励空间力量理论的发展，除了陆、海、空和网络力量之外，太空力量的战略意也应被考虑到。

Moreover, Gray frequently wrote on nuclear weapons and the imperative to defend against their use. In noting the intersection of nuclear weapons and spacepower, he considered nuclear intercontinental ballistic missiles to be space vehicles for most of their flight regime. Even though during the Cold War nuclear weapons benefited mutual deterrence between the Soviet Union and the United States, these “absolute weapons” were strategically unhelpful in use. Consequently, nuclear weapons are inherently and fatally limited as a practical war-fighting tool.[3] Also, Gray believed that eschewing strategic defenses against nuclear weapons was both imprudent and immoral. Gray argued for defenses against nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles as the basis for deterrence-by-denial strategy and a hedge against deterrence failure. In particular, he viewed SDI as a credible defensive approach, potentially rendering Soviet nuclear-armed ballistic missiles impotent and obsolete as reliable military instruments.[4] Taken as a whole, Gray’s views over the decades directly influenced both U.S. declara-tory and action policies regarding missile defense and the eventual Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty withdrawal.

此外，格雷经常撰写关于核武器和防御其使用的必要性的文章。在提到核武器和空间力量的交集时，他认为核洲际弹道导弹在其大多数飞行阶段中都是空间运载工具。尽管在冷战期间，核武器有利于美苏之间的相互威慑，但这些“绝对武器”在战略上是无益的。因此作为一种实际的战争工具，核武器天生具有致命性。此外，格雷认为，回避针对核武器的战略防御是轻率和不道德的。格雷还认为，对核武器和弹道导弹的防御是拒绝威慑战略的基础，是对威慑失败的对冲。特别是，他认为SDI是一种可靠的防御手段，这可能会使苏联拥有核武器的弹道导弹作为可靠的军事工具变得无能和过时。总的来说，格雷几十年来的观点直接影响了美国关于导弹防御的宣言和行动政策，以及最终退出反弹道导弹条约。

One of Gray’s best-known pieces on space strategy is his 1996 article “The Influence of Space Power upon History,” written while he was professor of politics and director of the Centre for Security Studies at the University of Hull. In this article he defines spacepower as “the ability to use space while denying reliable use to any foe.”5 He also laments that, despite spacepower’s growing importance as a domain of warfare, no comprehensive theory of it had been formulated and spacepower theorists remained scarce.6 He explores the potential reasons for the scarcity of notable spacepower theorists, and the epigraph that begins this essay comes from that article. Unbeknownst to Gray at the time, the quotation inspired many writers of spacepower theory and strategy who followed, including this author. Elaborating on the problem, he explained that “[t]oday, space power suffers from an unusual malady—an acute shortage of space focused strategic theory and the lack of a binding concept to aid understanding of what it is all about. People today, including many military professionals, remain less than enlightened on what space power is and does, how it works, and how it can and should function synergistically with other players in the joint military team.”7

格雷最著名的关于太空战略的文章之一是他1996年的文章《太空权对历史的影响》，这篇文章是他在赫尔大学担任政治学教授和安全研究中心主任时写的。在这篇文章中，他将太空权定义为“利用太空而不让任何敌人可靠利用的能力”。他还遗憾地说，尽管太空权作为一个战争领域的重要性日益增长，却没有一个全面的理论来阐述它，而且太空权的理论家仍然很少他探讨了缺乏著名太空权理论家的潜在原因，而这篇文章开头的题词就来自那篇文章。当时格雷并不知道，这句话启发了许多太空权理论和战略的作者，包括这位作者。在详细阐述这个问题时，他解释说:“如今，太空权理论正遭受着一种不寻常的疾病——专注于空间的战略理论严重短缺，缺乏一个具有约束力的概念来帮助理解它到底是什么。”今天的人们，包括许多军事专业人士，对太空权是什么、是什么、它是如何工作的，以及它可以和应该如何与联合军事团队中的其他参与者协同工作，仍然知之甚少。

Gray thought that an in-depth understanding of the theory of war and past strategic frameworks could be used to guide the development of a clearly articulated, all-encompassing strategy for military operations in and through space. Despite a few previous efforts to develop a comprehensive theory of space warfare, he observed that no adequate and full comprehensive theoretical framework of spacepower yet had been formulated and much work remained to be done.

格雷认为，对战争理论和过去战略框架的深入理解，可以用来指导太空军事行动，制定清晰、全面的战略。尽管在发展全面的太空战争理论方面做了一些努力，但他指出，目前还没有制定出充分和全面的太空权理论框架，还有许多工作要做。

Gray had many consistent themes in his writings throughout the decades, including his frequent reference to Carl von Clausewitz and the Prussian strategist’s theory of war.8 Clausewitz provided Gray with much of his intellectual ammunition, and “The Influence of Space Power upon History” is no exception in this regard. Clausewitz and Gray both held that the “grammar” and character of strategy are in a constant state of change, but its fundamental nature and logic are eternal. Drawing from this strategic truth, Gray advised that despite space warfare having its own distinct character, spacepower theory needs to fit within our understanding of Clausewitz’s writing and the enduring nature of war. Gray wrote, “War in space has its own distinctive characteristics that policy must know and respect, but that war has meaning only for the purposes of policy.”9 Despite being a new domain in which to consider the matter of human conflict, war in space—like war in all other domains—will serve the ends of policy in pursuit of political objectives.

在过去的几十年里，格雷的作品中有许多一致的主题，包括他经常引用卡尔·冯·克劳塞维茨和普鲁士战略家的战争理论，他们为格雷提供了大量的知识弹药，《太空权对历史的影响》在这方面也不例外。克劳塞维茨和格雷都认为，策略的“语法”和特征虽然处于不断变化的状态，但其基本性质和逻辑是永恒的。根据这一战略真理，格雷建议，尽管太空战争有其独特的特点，但太空力量理论需要符合我们对克劳塞维茨的作品和自古以来的战争原则的理解。格雷写道:“政策必须知道和尊重太空战争的独特特点，但战争只有为政策的目的而服务才有意义。“[9]尽管是一个考虑人类冲突问题的新领域，但太空战争——正如同其它领域的战争——将为追求政治目标的政策目的服务。

In his seminal book Modern Strategy, published in 1999, Gray wrote on spacepower’s place within the context of technological innovation and the future of warfare. Drawing on the work of geostrategist Halford Mackinder and Gray’s own novel thoughts regarding the strategic influence of geopolitics, Gray explored spacepower from the perspective of geography, writing as follows: “[W]orks of theory explaining spacepower should explore the interconnectedness, indeed interdependence, of the different geographical environments. Spacepower is of little interest parse. Strategic interest lies in the consequences of its application for deterrence and the conduct of war as a whole, within a context lit by steady recognition of the authority of the principle that the land matters most.”[10]

在他1999年出版的影响深远的《现代战略》(Modern Strategy)一书中，格雷论述了太空权在技术创新和未来战争背景下的地位。格雷借鉴了地缘政治战略家哈尔福德·麦金德的著作和格雷自己关于地缘政治战略影响的新思想，从地理学的角度探讨了太空权，他写道:“解释太空权的各种理论应该探索不同地理环境的相互联系，甚至相互依赖。太空权本身没什么吸引力，其战略利益在于，在不断承认土地重要性原则的权威性的背景下，将其应用于威慑和进行整个战争的后果。

Furthermore, Gray noted that up to that point spacepower theory had been approached as almost everything but what it most truly is: the military exploitation of a new geographical medium, and a domain that needs to be understood on its own technical, tactical, and operational terms, if it is to produce maximum strategic effectiveness. Gray made it clear, however, that the unique geography of space does not point the way to some unique logic of strategy, let alone a unique irrelevance of strategy.11 Hence, spacepower doctrine still must observe the enduring nature of war and strategic theory.

此外,格雷指出，如果要产生最大的战略效果，太空权理论已经具备几乎所有条件，除了在全新的空间地理中需要的技术、战术、和操作条件。然而，格雷明确指出，独特的空间地理并不能为某些独特的战略逻辑指明道路，更不用说与战略无关的独特逻辑了。因此，太空力量理论仍然必须遵循自古以来的战略理论与战争原则。

Gray also looked to historical experience to offer insights into the application of spacepower. Drawing on the long-standing precedents of the application of seapower and airpower, Gray thought that spacepower was likely to play adjunct or supporting roles during conflicts. Despite the dearth of strategic experience in space and spacepower’s promise to bring comprehensive changes in the form and structure of armed conflict, Gray noted that spacepower must not be thought of as the panacea for terrestrial security il s. Additional y, he warned that new sources of advantage bring new sources of vulnerability—a maxim that seems especial y prescient for the United States and its rivals today within the space domain.12

格雷还参考了历史经验，为太空力量的应用提供了见解。尽管在太空方面缺乏战略经验，而且太空力量能给武装冲突的形式和结构带来全面的改变，根据长期以来使用海权和空权的先例，格雷认为太空力量很可能在冲突中起到辅助作用。格雷指出，太空力量不能被认为是解决地面安全问题的万灵药。他警告说，新的优势也会带来新的弱点——这句格言对于今天的美国及其太空领域的竞争对手来说，似乎具有特别的先见之明。

TEACHER AND MENTOR 教师与导师

Gray had a significant and lasting commitment to his doctoral students, and was kind and generous with his time. He routinely held brown-bag lunches and strategic seminars at the universities at which he taught. During these gatherings, his doctoral students had the opportunity to try out various thesis ideas, debate among themselves, and hear any insights or suggestions that Gray had on the subject. Gray felt it deeply important to prepare the next generation of strategists and strategic thinkers, and it showed whenever he interacted with his students. Even when in the midst of writing his latest book or preparing for the next class, Gray graciously would carve out time in his schedule to hear about his students’ research and offer suggestions. Being his usual self when giving pointed feedback, he displayed the gift of using great wit in telling stories and teaching memorable lessons.

格雷对他的博士学生有着重要而持久的承诺，并且对他很友好和慷慨于他的时间。他经常在自己任教的大学举办便当午餐和战略研讨会。在这些聚会中，他的博士生们有机会尝试各种不同的论文观点，他们之间进行辩论，并听取格雷在这个主题上的任何见解或建议。格雷认为培养下一代战略家和战略思想家非常重要，这一点在他与学生的互动中得到了体现。即使是在写新书或准备下一节课的时候，格雷也会在日程安排中抽出时间听取学生的研究，并提出建议。在给予有针对性的反馈时，他一如既往地表现了自己在讲故事和讲授难忘课程方面的天赋。

Let there be no mistake, however; Gray expected the highest levels of scholarship from those studying under him. As many of his students can attest, he routinely gave extensive feedback on drafts of their doctoral theses. Often, the margins of a thesis were full of his comments—in his famous red ink—regarding language use, the need for clarity, and the pitfalls of overstatement. Gray consistently taught the lesson of never taking for granted that the reader would invest time in your work; one should strive constantly to make one’s research and writing the absolute best possible while getting to the “so what?” of the matter.

然而，不要弄错了;格雷希望他的学生能获得最高水平的奖学金。正如他的许多学生可以证明的那样，他经常对他们的博士论文草稿给予广泛的反馈。通常，一篇论文的页边空白处都是他的评论——用他著名的红墨水写的——关于语言的使用，对清晰的要求，以及夸大的陷阱。格雷一直告诉我们，不要想当然地认为读者认真对待你的作品；即使被问起诸如“那又怎样?”，一个人也应该不断努力，使自己的研究和写作尽可能好。

Ultimately, Gray’s teaching and mentorship likely are responsible for at least one generation of spacepower theorists in the United States, as well as around the world. He routinely recognized the talents of aspiring authors and helped ensure that their works saw the light of day through publication.13 Working behind the scenes, he also advanced the careers of others, including advocating for those he mentored to fill teaching positions at universities when opportunities arose. Gray’s generosity and refreshing lack of towering ego were enhanced by the fact that he was incredibly well connected, albeit quietly, within the U.S. military space community. This lent credibility to his own ideas, as well as those of others who studied under him. Through his steadfast efforts and support, Gray developed and promoted a cadre of individuals who collectively advanced spacepower strategic thought.

最终，格雷的教学和指导可能对美国乃至全世界至少一代的太空力量理论家产生了影响。他经常赏识有抱负的作家的才华，并通过幕后工作帮助他们的作品得以公之于世，他还促进了其他人的职业发展，包括支持他指导过的那些人在合适时填补大学教职。格雷在美国太空军事领域有着令人难以置信的良好关系，尽管他很安静，但这一事实增强了他的慷慨和令人耳目一新的意识。这为他自己及学生们的观点增添了可信度。通过坚定的努力和支持，格雷培养和提拔了一批集体推进太空权战略思想的骨干。

INSIGHTS FOR TODAY’S SPACE PROFESSIONALS 对当今太空专业人士的见解

Much has changed since Gray first penned his ideas on spacepower theory. Recently the United States established the newest branch of its armed forces, the U.S. Space Force, and published its inaugural space capstone publication, Spacepower: Doctrine for Space Forces.14

自从格雷第一次写出他的太空权理论以来，情况发生了很大的变化。最近，美国建立了其武装力量的最新分支——美国太空部队，并出版了它的第一份标志性的出版物《太空力量:太空部队的学说》

Because of Gray’s consistent message regarding the enduring nature of war despite the application of new technologies and operational concepts, his writings remain timeless in their utility and insights. What follows are some reminders derived from Gray’s contributions for today’s space professionals and members of the U.S. Space Force, as we consider the reemergence of great-power competition and the ever-expanding national-security interests in space.

尽管应用了新技术和作战概念，但格雷始终如一地传达了自古以来的战争原则，因此他的著作一如既往地保持了实用性和洞察力。以下是格雷对当今太空专业人员和美国太空部队成员的一些帮助，在我们考虑重新出现的大国竞争和太空中不断扩大的国家安全利益时，对这些帮助的一些提示。

Space Is Not a Sanctuary 太空不是避难所

Gray routinely held views that differed from the prevalent thinking of the day. Many of his contemporaries viewed space as a sanctuary that should be free of conflict. While today the United States and many of its allies recognize space as a “warfighting domain,” this is a recent phenomenon; in the early 1980s, it traditional y was held by most within the U.S. national-security space community that space was a sanctuary, or a domain where military conflict would never extend. Gray disagreed and stated emphatical y in American Military Space Policy, “No satellite system, no matter how high its orbit or sophisticated its survival aids, enjoys assured survivability. Space is not a sanctuary.”15 Approaching spacepower theory in a way reflecting classical strategy leads to the understanding that militarily useful geographies eventual y will be exploited and contested.16 He observed that many senior U.S. officials of the day incorrectly viewed the survivability of satellites in geosynchronous orbit as an irrefutable certainty.17

格雷一贯持有与当时的主流思想不同的观点。他的许多同时代人将太空视为一个不应该有冲突的避难所。虽然今天美国及其许多盟国都将太空视为“作战领域”，但这是最近才出现的现象;上世纪80年代初，美国国家安全太空领域的大多数人传统上认为，太空是一个避难所，是军事冲突永远不会扩大的领域。格雷不同意这一观点，他在《美国军事空间政策》中强调:“任何卫星系统，无论它的轨道有多高，也不管它的生存辅助装置有多先进，都不会享有绝对的生存能力。”太空不是避难所。以一种反映经典战略的方式研究太空权理论，会使人们认识到，对军事有用的地理区域最终会被利用和争夺他指出，当时许多美国高级官员错误地把地球同步轨道上卫星的生存能力看作是无可辩驳的事实。

Many of his thoughts regarding the falacies of the sanctuary school of thought and the vulnerability of satellites were reflected in the spacepower writings that followed.18 Providing a perspective based on experience and the fundamentals of strategy, in his 2005 book Another Bloody Century: Future Warfare Gray observed as follows: “It is a rule in strategy, one derived empirical y from the evidence of two and a half millennia, that anything of great strategic importance to one belligerent, for that reason has to be worth attacking by others. And the greater the importance, the greater has to be the incentive to damage, disable, capture, or destroy it. In the bluntest of statements: space warfare is a certainty in the future because the use of space in war has become vital.”19 Gray understood the fal acies of viewing space as a sanctuary. Thinking this way would result in developed and fielded space systems being vulnerable to attack and of questionable survivability during a conflict extending into space. The dogmatic view of space being a sanctuary would lead to the dangerous condition of peacetime efficiency and convenience preventing serious preparations for war. As a practical matter, and on the basis of historical experience, Gray viewed the United States as having no realistic choice other than to be prepared to fight in space—an enterprise that must involve the development of both offensive and defensive capabilities.20

他关于庇护学派的谬论和卫星的脆弱性的许多想法，都反映在随后的空间力量著作中。在2005年出版的《另一个血腥世纪:未来战争》一书中，格雷基于经验和战略基础提出了如下观点:“这是一个战略规则，一个从2500年的证据中得出的经验法则，任何对一个交战国具有重大战略意义的东西，必须值得其他交战国攻击。它越重要，就越有动机去破坏，失能，捕获或摧毁它。最直言不讳的说法是:太空战争在未来是必然的，因为在战争中利用太空已经变得至关重要。”格雷明白把太空看作避难所的错误之处。这种想法将导致已开发和已部署的太空系统容易受到攻击，并难以在向太空扩展的冲突中生存。把太空视为避难所的教条观点将导致和平时期效率和便利的危险状况，妨碍认真的战争准备。作为一个实际的问题，根据历史经验，格雷认为美国除了准备太空作战之外别无选择，这是一项必须同时发展进攻和防御能力的事业。

Challenges of Space Arms Control 军控条约面临的挑战

Gray was a consistent critic of many arms-control approaches used during the Cold War, including those related to the space domain.21 In his 1992 book House of Cards: Why Arms Control Must Fail, he wrote the following on the paradox of arms control: “[T]he first paradox, dignified throughout the remainder of this book as ‘the arms control paradox,’ postulates that if arms control is needed in a strategic relationship because states in question might go to war, it will be impractical for that very reason of need, whereas, if arms control should prove to be available, it will be irrelevant.”22

格雷一贯批评冷战期间使用的许多军备控制方法，包括那些与空间领域有关的方法。在他1992年出版的《纸牌屋:为什么军控必须失败》一书中，他对军控的悖论写道:“第一个悖论，在本书的其余部分被尊称为“军备控制悖论”，它假设如果在战略关系中需要军备控制方法，因为有关国家可能会开战，正因为开战的可能性，这将是不切实际的需要，然而，如果军备控制方法被证明是可用的，那它本身将是无关紧要的”。

On the limitations of arms control and its frequent pitfalls, Gray noted that many arms-control proponents asserted that the United States needed an arms-control agreement far more than the Soviet Union did, because of the disparity in space dependencies between the two sides. These advocates, however, tended to neglect such crucial issues as the scope of activity to be constrained, methods of verification, and the Soviet theory of war.23 On the whole, when considering the various space arms-control proposals, he viewed them as “pious nonsense,” because unduly uncritical obeisance was paid to an arms-control credo that reflected a triumph of hope over experience. Cutting to the crux of the problem, Gray explained that “[h]istory and the common sense of international politics tel s us that one cannot legislate against military technologies that states have strong incentives to pursue.” In contrast to the arms-control advocates of the time, the Soviets understood and used the arms-control process as one of several interdependent instruments of conducting international relations effectively and limiting the strengths of other countries, including the United States.24

在谈到军备控制的局限性及其经常出现的问题时，格雷指出，许多军备控制的支持者坚称，美国比苏联更需要一份军备控制协议，因为双方在空间依赖上存在差异。然而，这些提倡者往往忽视诸如应受限制的活动范围、核查方法和苏联战争理论等关键问题。总的来说，在考虑各种各样的太空军备控制建议时，他认为这些建议都是“虔诚的无稽之谈”，因为人们对军备控制条约表示了不加批判的顺从，而这种信条反映了希望战胜了经验。格雷直击问题的症结，解释说:“历史和国际政治常识告诉我们，一个国家不能对有强烈动机追求的军事技术进行立法。”与当时主张军备控制的人相反，苏联人理解并利用军备控制进程作为有效地处理国际关系和限制包括美国在内的其他国家力量的几个体系化工具之一。

Gray thought that the United States should not sign any arms-control treaty formally conceding superiority to the Soviet Union.25 He thought historical experience had demonstrated that the Soviet Union had violated arms-control agreements when it was administratively convenient, militarily advantageous, and economically efficient to do so.26 Without a sound understanding of the technological trends that should be encouraged or discouraged, “arms control negotiators are engaged in an exercise that is little more than a lottery.” Gray was a staunch advocate of the United States maintaining its strategic advantage in space capabilities, and he consistently advised U.S. policy leaders that the United States should not seek to obtain, or settle for, equality in space weaponry (whether it be equality in deployment or nondeployment of space capabilities).27 He confessed, “I am profoundly skeptical of the likely practical value of the arms control process to help fashion a military space environment conducive to the best interests of the United States.” Gray believed that solutions to the dilemmas of deterring conflict must be sought in the realm of politics, “not in weapons technologies or in arms-control band-aids.”28 A key takeaway for space professionals is that these inherent problems associated with arms control likely will reemerge during any future discussions on banning military technologies that states have strong incentives to pursue, such as direct-ascent, hit-to-kill antisatellite missiles or on-orbit kinetic-kill vehicles.

格雷认为，美国不应该签署任何正式向苏联让步的军控条约。他认为，历史经验已经证明，在行政上方便、军事上有利、经济上有效时，苏联会违反军控条约达成的协议。如果对应该鼓励或阻止的技术趋势没有充分的了解，“军备控制”谈判代表所从事的是一种和抽签差不多的活动。”格雷坚定的倡导美国维护其空间战略优势，他一贯建议美国政策领导人,美国不应寻求获得,或接受太空武器的均势(不管是平等部署或非部署化空间功能)的低位。他承认:“我对军控进程可能具有的实用价值深表怀疑，该进程有助于打造一种有利于美国最佳利益的军事太空环境。”格雷认为，必须在政治领域寻求制止冲突困境的解决办法，而不是在武器技术或军控领域打补丁。对于太空专业人士来说，一个重要的结论是，这些与军备控制相关的内在问题可能会在未来任何有关禁止军事技术的讨论中再次出现，而这些技术是各国有强烈动机追求的，比如直升弹道反卫星武器、反卫星撞击弹或在轨动能杀伤器。

Be Wary of the Next “Big Idea” 警惕下一个“大创意”

Gray noted that there is a long history of the periodic reemergence of technology’s application as a “hot” and “new” strategic concept within the U.S. defense community. He observed the succession of purportedly novel strategic concepts that repeatedly have gained popularity, and then official endorsements, on the basis of a largely false promise of superior performance. He warned, “There wil always be a market for new sounding ideas expressed in jargon and neatly acro-nymic. They come, they go, and they reappear in slightly different guise in the future.”29 Technology zealots’ claims that new strategic concepts will guarantee winning of the next war fall within the “zone of snake oil salesmanship.”30

格雷指出，在美国国防界，技术应用作为“热门”和“新”战略概念的周期性重新出现由来已久。他观察到，一系列所谓新颖的战略概念屡屡受到欢迎，然后得到官方的认可，而这些认可的基础基本上是虚假的业绩承诺。他警告说:“用行话和简洁的首字母缩略词表达的新想法总是有市场的。”它们来了又走，然后在未来以略微不同的姿态再次出现。技术狂热者声称新的战略概念将保证下次战争的胜利，这种说法属于“骗人的推销术”范畴.

Because space warfare frequently involves advanced technology, and because space only recently has come to be considered a domain for conflict, space professionals should remain vigilant against those touting the next “big idea.” Consistent through much of his writings, Gray advised current and future strategists that there are just three defenses against the usually false—or at least exaggerated—strategic promise of the hot, new concept: common sense, experience, and a sound education in strategy—especially in the enduring works of Thucydides, Sun-tzu, and Clausewitz.31

由于太空战争经常涉及先进技术，而且太空直到最近才被认为是一个冲突的领域，太空专家应该对那些兜售下一个“伟大想法”的人保持警惕。格雷的作品一致建议，当前和未来的战略家们只要有三个针对谬误战略承诺与新概念——至少是过于夸大的理论——的防御手段：常识、经验和可靠的战略教育——特别是修昔底德、孙子、和克劳塞维茨的不朽作品。31

Predictive Failure Will Occur 预测失败将会发生

Gray also observed a frequent trend—especial y within defense policy circles and think tanks within Washington, DC—of seeking to predict the future. He warned against this predilection and the pervasive use of the phrase “the foreseeable future.” Gray warned that the future is not knowable in any detail. One of the responsibilities of the strategist, Gray advised, is to prevent “the enthronement of the kind of official strategic certainty which precludes the development of strategic and military postural flexibility.”32 Experts and policy makers who advance a knowable and certain future are dangerous to their organizations, as well to those in the fighting forces who will need to carry out their ill-conceived vision.

格雷还观察到一个经常出现的趋势——尤其是在国防政策圈和华盛顿特区的智库中——寻求预测未来。他对这种倾向和“可预见的未来”一词的普遍使用提出了警告。格雷警告说，未来的任何细节都是不可知的。格雷建议说，战略家的职责之一就是防止“那种官方战略确定性的占位，它妨碍了战略和军事姿态灵活性的发展。”“推动一个可知和确定的未来的专家和决策者对他们的组织和作战部队中的那些人来说都是危险的，因为他们需要实现他们的错误设想。

In contrast, Gray thought that strategists need to acknowledge the reality that predictive failure will occur. Strategists must contend with friction, chance, and uncertainty, and consequently strategists should be adaptable and flexible over a range of plausible—and some implausible—threats, to protect national interests wherever they lie. In providing guidance regarding an unknowable future, Gray wrote that “strategists have no choice other than to cope with their unavoidable ignorance as best they may.”33 Consequently, today’s space professionals and strategists should plan across the gamut of scenarios and potential futures to account for the inherent failings of predictive analysis.

与此相反，格雷认为，战略家需要承认这样一个现实，即预测失败将会发生。战略家们必须与摩擦、机遇和不确定性作斗争，因此，战略家们应该在一系列看似可信的——甚至是不可信的——威胁中具有适应性和灵活性，以保护国家利益。在为不可知的未来提供指导时，格雷写道:“战略家别无选择，只能尽其所能应对不可避免的无知。”33因此，今天的空间专业人员和战略家应该对整个场景和潜在的未来进行规划，以解释预测分析的固有缺陷。

Space Is Critical, but Avoid Overstatement 空间很重要，但要避免夸大

Gray frequently advised that spacepower should fit within a joint war-fighting framework and the larger wartime effort. He commented, “Spacepower must always be useful, but its precise roles and actual strategic utility will be distinctive to each class and case of conflict.”34 The lesson for competition in space is that planning should include conditions in which space-related activities wil contribute significantly to war’s conclusion, and those situations in which it wil not. When advocating for the importance of including spacepower and space capabilities in joint and coalition warfare, Gray advised, “Space warriors today should not compensate for the general underappreciation in the armed services by indulging in overstatement.”35 It is paramount that space professionals understand full y the implications of space being a war-fighting domain, while acknowledging the limits of spacepower.

格雷经常建议，太空权理论应该符合联合作战框架和更大的战时努力。他评论说:“太空权必须总是有用的，但它的精确作用和实际的战略效用将是不同的类别和冲突案例。“34关于太空竞争的教训是，规划应包括与空间有关的活动、对战争的结束有重大贡献的条件和对战争没有重大贡献的情况。在倡导将太空权和太空能力纳入联合作战和联合作战的重要性时，格雷建议说:“今天的太空战士不应该沉溺于夸大其词，以弥补对军事服务的普遍低估。”至关重要的是，太空专业人员要充分理解太空作为一个战争领域的影响，同时要认识到太空权的局限性。

Even though there are no reasons why space operations cannot deliver decisive strategic effects to achieve success, the conditions allowing for such a victory should be considered rare indeed. This is because for conflict to have the greatest impact and affect the strategic level of war, it must affect the preponderance of people where they live. Gray wrote, “[A]ll conflict must have terrestrial reference because man can live only upon the land.” As a result, there will be practical limits to what space operations can achieve strategical y, no matter how significant a level of command of space is achieved or how well operations are executed. Although command of space may achieve strategic effect, tactical and operational space actions will be strategical y decisive in determining a war’s outcome only on the rarest occasions. This is because strategic effect is decided by the target, not by the means of attack.36

尽管没有理由说空间行动不能提供决定性的战略效果以取得成功，但允许这种胜利的条件确实应该被认为是罕见的。这是因为，要使冲突产生最大的影响并影响到战争的战略水平，它必须影响到他们所居住的地方的人民的优势。格雷写道:“所有的冲突都必须与陆地有关，因为人类只能生活在陆地上。”因此，无论对空间的控制程度有多高，或作战执行得有多好，空间作战所能达到的战略目标都将受到实际的限制。虽然空间指挥可以达到战略效果，但战术和作战空间行动在决定战争结果方面具有战略决定性作用的情况极为罕见。这是因为战略效果是由目标决定的，而不是由攻击手段决定的

Gray viewed spacepower as often augmenting the effectiveness of air, sea, and land power.37 In noting how space forces and capabilities should be used during conflict, Gray observed, “Military space ventures have been inherently adjunct, supportive, and ancil ary to the main terrestrial action of modern strategy.”38 Each branch of the armed forces has distinctive strengths and limitations, and space forces must contribute to this joint endeavor to achieve success in deterrence and war. Space warfare necessitates thinking about spacepower from a joint perspective and an all-domain approach. Consequently, spacepower and associated space capabilities should embrace their role within the application of land-, maritime-, and air-focused military forces.

格雷认为太空力量经常增强海、空、陆力量的作战效能。在谈到如何在冲突中使用太空部队和能力时，格雷指出:“军事太空冒险一直以来都是现代战略中主要地面行动的辅助、支持和辅助。三军各有各的优势和局限性，太空部队必须共同努力，取得威慑和战争的胜利。太空战争需要从联合的角度和全领域的方法来思考空间力量。因此，空间力量和相关的空间能力应该在以陆地、海洋和空中为重点的军事力量的应用中发挥作用。

Being in a supporting role, however, does not make space forces less important. Indeed, winning in the space domain is still critical. Gray commented, “As the leading edge of overall U.S. combat potency, space power will decide the course and outcome of some conflicts, even though space forces may not themselves be combat forces with offensive capabilities.”39

然而，作为一个辅助角色，并不会使空间力量变得不那么重要。事实上，在太空领域取胜仍然至关重要。格雷评论说:“太空力量作为美国整体战斗力的前沿，将决定一些冲突的进程和结果，即使太空力量本身可能不是具有进攻能力的战斗力量。

Gray’s ideas and writings inspired many to advance the cause of strategy, including that related to the space domain.40 His ability to explain the most complex ideas in a simple manner while always answering the “so what?” question was a true gift to the development of spacepower theory. He crafted strategic lessons for spacepower on the basis of the universal principles of strategy and essential unity in all strategic experience.

格雷的思想和著作激励了许多人推进战略事业，包括与空间领域相关的战略他能够以简单的方式解释最复杂的想法，同时总是回答“那又怎样?”这个问题对太空力量理论的发展是一份真正的礼物。他根据战略的普遍原则和所有战略经验的基本统一，为太空力量制定了战略教训。

While many of Gray’s ideas were considered novel and counter to mainstream spacepower thinking at the time, his writings and ideas have gained acceptance over time. In fact, his “intellectual fingerprints” are al over many of the most significant works on spacepower, even including the aforementioned Spacepower: Doctrine for Space Forces, which was published in June 2020. Most importantly, because his ideas on strategy are based on historical experience within the context of the enduring nature of war, his writings remain timeless in their relevance today and will remain so into the future.

虽然格雷的许多想法都被认为是新颖的，与当时主流的太空力量思想背道而驰，但随着时间的推移，他的作品和想法已被人们接受。事实上，他的“思想指纹”覆盖了许多关于太空力量的最重要的作品，甚至包括前面提到的《太空力量:太空部队的理论》，这本书于2020年6月出版。最重要的是，由于他的战略思想是基于自古以来的战争本质，他的著作在今天和未来都将是永恒的。

N O T E S

The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of Falcon Research, the George Washington University, or the U.S. government.

本文仅代表作者意见，与Falcon Research、乔治华盛顿大学或美国政府无关。

Because Gray later in his career used spacepower as one word, that is the usage employed here, except when referencing quoted material.

由于格雷在之后的事业中使用“Spacepower”作为一个单词，该用法继承于本文除引用之外的部分。

2. Colin S. Gray, American Military Space Policy: Information Systems, Weapon Systems and Arms Control (Lanham, MD: Univ. Press of America, 1984), p. ix.

3. Colin S. Gray, The Navy in the Post–Cold War World: The Uses and Value of Strategic Sea Power (University Park: Pennsylvania State Univ. Press, 1994), p. 133.

4. Colin S. Gray, War, Peace, and Victory: Strategy and Statecraft for the Next Century (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1990), pp. 122, 227.

5. Colin S. Gray, “The Influence of Space Power upon History,” Comparative Strategy 15, no.4 (October–December 1996), p. 293. Using similar language a few years later, Gray wrote: “Spacepower refers to the ability to use space and to deny such use to a foe.” Colin S. Gray, Modern Strategy (London: Oxford Univ.Press, 1999), p. 244

6. Gray, Modern Strategy.

7. Gray, “The Influence of Space Power upon History,” pp. 304, 307.

8. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans.Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1989).

9. Gray, The Navy in the Post–Cold War World, pp. 135–36, 305.

10. Gray, Modern Strategy, p. 256. For further discussion of the space domain as geography, see Colin S. Gray, series editor’s preface to Everett C. Dolman, Astropolitik: Classical Geopolitics in the Space Age (London: Frank Cass, 2002), pp. xi–xii.

11. Gray, Modern Strategy, pp. 254–55, 259.

12. Gray, “The Influence of Space Power upon History,” pp. 293, 298, 303.

13. For example, see Dolman, Astropolitik; Steven Lambakis, On the Edge of Earth: The Future of American Space Power (Lexington: Univ.Press of Kentucky, 2001); and John B. Sheldon and Colin S. Gray, “Theory Ascendant? Spacepower and the Challenge of Strategic Theory,” in Toward a Theory of Spacepower: Selected Essays, ed. Charles D. Lutes and Peter L. Hays (Washington, DC: National Defense Univ. Press, 2011).

14. U.S. Space Force, Spacepower: Doctrine for Space Forces (Washington, DC: Headquarters U.S. Space Force, June 2020).

15. Gray, American Military Space Policy, p. 105.

16. Gray, Modern Strategy, p. 244.

17. Gray, American Military Space Policy, p. 94.

18. For descriptions of the sanctuary and vulnerability schools of thought, along with their limitations, see David E. Lupton, On Space Warfare: A Space Power Doctrine (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air Univ. Press, 1988).

19. Colin S. Gray, Another Bloody Century: Future Warfare (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson,2005), p. 307. There are so many more insights from Gray’s writings that cannot be detailed here for the sake of brevity. For an in-depth discussion of the advantages and limitations of using analogies, see Sheldon and Gray, “Theory Ascendant?”

20. Gray, American Military Space Policy, pp. 69, 94, 104.

21. Colin S. Gray, “Space Arms Control: A Skeptical View,” Air University Review 37, no. 1 (November–December 1985), pp.73–86.

22. Colin S. Gray, House of Cards: Why Arms Control Must Fail (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ.Press, 1992), p. 17.

23. Gray, American Military Space Policy, p. 5.

24. Ibid., p. 8; Gray, “Space Arms Control,” pp.74, 76.

25. Gray, “Space Arms Control,” p. 77.

26. Gray, House of Cards, p. 17.

27. Gray, American Military Space Policy, pp.76–77.

28. Gray, “Space Arms Control,” pp. 74, 78.

29. Colin S. Gray, Fighting Talk: Forty Maxims on War, Peace, and Strategy (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 2007), p. 65.

30. Gray, “The Influence of Space Power upon History,” p. 299.

31. Gray, Fighting Talk, p. 65.

32. Ibid., pp. 155, 160.

33. Ibid., p. 155.

34. Gray, Modern Strategy, p. 264.

35. Gray, “The Influence of Space Power upon History,” p. 299.

36. Colin S. Gray, Airpower for Strategic Effect (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air Univ. Press, 2012), pp. 278, 282.

37. Gray, The Navy in the Post–Cold War World, p. 158.

38. Gray, Modern Strategy, p. 254.

39. Gray, “The Influence of Space Power upon History,” p. 303.

40. Beatrice Heuser et al., “Policy Roundtable: Remembering Colin Gray,” Texas National Security Review 3, no. 3 (Summer 2020), available at [链接登录后可见] David J. Lonsdale, “Colin S.Gray: A Reminiscence,” War on the Rocks, 22 June 2020, [链接登录后可见]